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Like father, like son. In 1990, then-President George H.W. Bush led the United
States into war against Iraq-the Persian Gulf War. His son, current President George
W. Bush, recently led the U.S. into another war with Iraq. While Congress did not
officially declare war, it gave the President authorization to use military force in Iraq.1
Important questions would have arisen if President Bush had sent troops to Iraq
without congressional authorization--questions regarding the extent of constitutional
and statutory war powers vested in both the President and Congress, questions
regarding the widely held belief that the President is the sole proprietor of war
powers,2 and questions regarding the consequences for the President if Congress has
not provided authorization for military force.
This Note addresses the situation in which the President commences a military
operation without congressional authorization, and ninety days passes (per the War
Powers Resolution). More specifically within that context, this Note addresses a
hypothetical situation that has yet to happen in American history: congressional
passage of a law (over the President's veto) requiring removal of troops from a military
operation.4 Serious constitutional questions surface about which governmental branch,
executive or legislative, has the power to determine the outcome of this particular
situation. Would this hypothetical law pass constitutional muster? Could President
Bush, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces,5 be forced to
remove those troops? If he did not remove the troops, what recourse would Congress
have?
Part I examines the storied and tumultuous history of Congress and the President's
fight over war powers. Part II considers the constitutionality of Congress passing a law
requiring the removal of troops from a military operation, in light of Justices
Frankfurter's and Jackson's constitutional impasse tests from Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6 concluding that the President's constitutional power in the
situation would not be as great as that of Congress's. Part III contemplates what would
happen if the President ignores Congress and refuses to remove troops, and what
Congress can do to enforce such a law, such as impeach, sue, or cut funding. While
prior suits of this kind against the President have been dismissed on various grounds,
this Note concludes that a lawsuit by members of Congress to enjoin the President
from continued military action would prove to be successful in this situation.
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
2. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J.
931, 980 (1999).
3. See War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000) (requiring the President to
terminate United States Armed Forces military operations after sixty days if there has been no
congressional authorization for the particular military operation, with a possible extension of an
additional thirty days if the President feels it is necessary).
4. While there have been countless articles and books devoted to war powers, none has
addressed this particular hypothetical situation.
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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I. THE HISTORY OF WAR POWERS
The roles of Congress and the President with regard to war powers have been
debated since America's Founding Fathers wrote our Constitution. Only in the past
7sixty years has the President asserted a seeming monopoly over war powers,
prompting Congress in 1973 to pass the War Powers Resolution 8 over President
Nixon's veto.9 Even though the War Powers Resolution was supposed to restore the
balance of war powers between Congress and the President,' 0 Presidents have skirted
the Resolution since its passage, and even greater, some have completely ignored it."
A. The Text of the Constitution and the Framers' Intent
The Constitution itself provides Congress with many more duties and
responsibilities pertaining to war than it does to the President. Congress is empowered
to "provide for the common Defence,"' 12 declare war,' 3 grant letters of marque and
reprisal,14 make rules "concerning Captures on Land and Water,"15 raise and support
armies 16 and a navy, 17 make rules regulating the armed forces, 18 "provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions,"'19 provide for "organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia," 20 and
governing the parts of the militia that "may be employed in the Service of the United
States.",2' The President's war powers are stated much more concisely: 'The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." 22
Constitutional scholars maintain that during the Constitutional Convention in 1787,
it was clear that the Framers did not want to vest war-making powers solely in the
hands of the Executive. 23 Believing that authorization of war should be part of the
democratic process, the Framers "felt that the Congress, as the most representative
7. See infra Parts I.B-D.
8. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (2000)). The War Powers Resolution will be discussed in more depth infra Part
I.C.
9. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 965.
10. War Powers Resolution § 2(a),.50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2000).
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 13.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
21.Id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
23. See Michael Hahn, Note, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J.
2351, 2358 (2001).
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body, was the best qualified to make this decision., 24 James Madison opposed putting
the power to declare war in the hands of the same person who would conduct a war,
arguing that one person could not be trusted to determine "whether a war ought to be
commenced, continued or concluded., 25 Further, in The Federalist No. 69, Alexander
Hamilton strongly implied that the reason for giving Congress such powers over war
was to avoid complete control over the military by one person, as was the case with the
king of Great Britain.26 "The President will have only the occasional command of such
part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual
service of the Union."27 The Legislature, by contrast, is in charge of declaring war, as
well as raising and regulating fleets and armies.
28
The Framers further debated whether the Constitution should give Congress the
power to "make" war, or the power to "declare" war.29 In deciding to use the word
"declare" rather than "make," the Framers wanted to allow the President to quickly
initiate war if the United States or its troops abroad were suddenly attacked, with no
time to gain the consent of Congress. In any other situation, however, Congress
would have the sole power to initiate war,3 1 and the President's power to repel sudden
attacks "did not extend to taking the country into full-scale war or to mount an
offensive attack against other nations.,
32
B. The Downfall of Congressional War Powers: World War I and Korea
Until World War II, the balance of war powers between Congress and the President
was largely maintained. President Franklin Roosevelt altered this balance by0,4
expanding the President's power over the military "to an unprecedented degree." At
the end of the 1940s, there was a widely held belief that Congress had compromised
much of its war powers, allowing the President to use the Armed Forces at his will.
35
As a writer for the New York Times stated, many Americans believed that the
President's power to repel sudden attacks "had developed into an undefined power...
to employ without congressional authorization the armed forces in the protection of
American rights and interests abroad whenever necessary. 36
Congress attempted to curb presidential control by directing standing committees to
24. Id.
25. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Fisher, supra note 2, at 939.
30. Id.; see Hahn, supra note 23, at 2357.
31. See Hahn, supra note 23, at 2355-56.
32. Fisher, supra note 2, at 939.
33. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 91-129 (Comm. on Foreign Relations), 91ST
CONG. (1st Sess. 1969).
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 15.
36. Edward S. Corwin, Who Has the Power to Make War?, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1949,
(Magazine), at 14.
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keep watch over executive activities, 37 while President Roosevelt assured Congress
that its power would return to normal once World War II ended.38 Despite these
assurances, Roosevelt's practice of skirting constitutional war powers requirements
started a trend for future Presidents. Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, single-
handedly involved the United States in the Korean War without seeking Congress's
approval,39 beginning a "new era in the exercise of presidential prerogative., 40 This
marked the first time that a President, on his own, involved the United States in a
major war, while Congress sat idly by.41 In 1952, a steel workers' strike threatened to
stop the supply of arms and ammunition to U.S. troops. Arguing that such a stoppage
constituted a national emergency, President Truman attempted to further wield his
presidential power by issuing an executive order to seize steel mills.43 The Supreme
Court struck down President Truman's executive order in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.44
Justice Black, writing for the Youngstown majority, found that President Truman
overstepped his constitutional bounds by issuing the order,45 and that "[t]he Founders
of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and
bad times. 46 In addition to Justice Black's opinion, Youngstown contained four
concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion, the most significant of which are the
concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.47 Focusing on the issue of
separation of powers, both of these concurrences contained appropriate constitutional
frameworks to use in determining when a President has stepped into the constitutional
realm of Congress. These two concurring opinions will be analyzed in Parts II.B and
II.C.
C. Vietnam and the War Powers Resolution
After the Korean War, the next major U.S. military conflict was the Vietnam War.
As well as was both an unsuccessful and costly war for the United States, the Vietnam
War was a "marked example of unilateral executive initiative in leading U.S. military
37. Fisher, supra note 2, at 946.
38. In a message presented to Congress in 1942, President Roosevelt stated that "[w]hen the
war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people-to whom they
belong." 88 CONG. REC. 7044 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1942).
39. Fisher, supra note 2, at 946.
40. Martin S. Sheffer, Does Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely?, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
233, 279 (1999).
41. Fisher, supra note 2, at 946.
42. Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1156 (2001).
43. Id.
44. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45. Id. at 587-88.
46. Id. at 589.
47. The two respective tests laid out by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in Youngstown are
applicable when there is a "constitutional impasse" or "actual confrontation" between Congress
and the President. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 105-
13 (1990); Com, supra note 42, at 1157.
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affairs., 48 Based on later-discredited facts, President Lyndon Johnson underhandedly
convinced Congress in August 1964 to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,49 which
authorized President Johnson to resist armed attacks against U.S. forces and "prevent
further aggression."5° Under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Johnson felt that
he did not need a congressional declaration of war to lawfully engage in military
operations in Vietnam.
51
In 1969, Congress began to question the President's (then Richard Nixon) power to
act unilaterally with regard to the war, after the situation in Vietnam became
increasingly unfavorable for United States forces. z Mentioning the intent of the
Framers as well as historical examples from past military conflicts, members of
Congress lambasted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as well as Presidents Johnson's
and Nixon's actions, as unconstitutional.53 After another few years of unsuccessful
operations in Vietnam and President Nixon's continued disregard of congressional
pleas to obey the constitutional war powers structure, Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution54 over President Nixon's veto.55
The War Powers Resolution was Congress's attempt to restore the constitutional
balance of war powers so as to "fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of
the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into
hostilities. 56 A main component of the War Powers Resolution is the requirement that
the President must consult with Congress before entering into military operations.
This consultation requirement is not meant to be discretionary, but rather, the President
is "obliged by law to consult [with Congress] before the introduction of forces into
hostilities and to continue consultations so long as the troops are engaged.",
5 8
Further, when there is no congressional declaration of war, the War Powers
Resolution requires the President to submit a report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours
of any introduction of American troops into hostilities.5 9 Once this report is submitted
to Congress, the President must end any use of the Armed Forces within sixty days
48. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 771 (1996).
49. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 91-672, 812, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971). See also Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the
Millennium, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 11, 24 (2000).
50. H.R.J. Res. 1145.
51. Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474, 488 (1966).
52. S. REP. No. 91-129 (1969).
53. Id.
54. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§1541-1548 (2000).
55. RICHARD NIXON, VETOING HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542, A JOINT RESOLUTION
CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 93-171 (1973).
56. War Powers Resolution § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2000).
57. War Powers Resolution § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000).
58. 119 CONG. REc. 33,550 (1973)(explanation by Senator Jacob Javits of the Conference
Report).
59. War Powers Resolution § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2000).
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unless Congress declares war or authorizes use of military force. 60 The President can
61also extend the sixty-day deadline by an additional thirty days if it is necessary.
D. Presidential Disregard of the War Powers Resolution
Since the passage of the War Powers Resolution, Presidents have generally claimed
to have complied with its provisions, although their compliance has not always been
complete. 62 Many of the U.S. military conflicts after enactment of the War Powers
Resolution have been relatively minor. 63 The Persian Gulf War and the United States'
military involvement in Kosovo, however, have marked yet another impasse in
congressional attempts to legitimize the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
1. The Persian Gulf War
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President George Bush
immediately deployed U.S. Armed Forces to aid Kuwait's troops, and levied economic
sanctions against Iraq.64 One week later, President Bush reported to Congress,
"consistent with the War Powers Resolution., 65 In his report, President Bush
proclaimed that the mission was defensive, with the purpose of deterring Iraqi
aggression.66 On October 23, 1990, Congress enacted a bill to provide extra pay for
U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, but some members of Congress expressed concerns
that President Bush was acting without congressional authorization or consultation.67
By November 1990, there were approximately 230,000 U.S. troops in the Middle
60. War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000).
61. Id.
62. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 48, at 807-17, 836-44.
63. Examples include the following: President Carter's attempted military rescue of
American hostages in Iran in 1980, see id. at 808-10; President Reagan's attempts to deploy
Marines to Lebanon in 1982, see id. at 812-13; President Reagan's use of the Armed Forces to
help stabilize the government of Grenada in 1983, see id. at 814; the United States' bombing of
Libya in 1986, see id. at 814-15; protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in the
wake of the Iran-Iraq war in 1986, see id. at 815; President George Bush's invasion of Panama
in 1989 to end the rule of General Manuel Noriega, see id. at 815-16; the deployment of
Marines to Liberia in 1990 to evacuate U.S. nationals during a rebellion against the Liberian
government, see id. at 816-17; the deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia to help stabilize the
Somalian government in the wake of a new government in 1992, see id. at 839-41; President
Clinton's authorization of air strikes in Bosnia in the mid-'90s, see id. at 941- 4 2 ; the
deployment of U.S. troops in the mid-'90s to help restore a democratically elected government
in Haiti, see id at 842-44.
64. Id. at 817.
65. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the
Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, 26 WKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1225 (Aug. 9, 1990); see also Letter to the Speaker of the House and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate on Additional Economic Measures Taken with Respect to
Iraq and Kuwait, 26 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1229 (Aug. 9, 1990).
66. 26 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 1225.
67. See SHANE& BRUFF, supra note 48, at 821.
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East, and President Bush declared that their mission was now offensive. 68 President
Bush's unilateral actions, turning a supposed defensive mission into an offensive one,
prompted two unsuccessful lawsuits against the President. 69 Congressional apathy for
President Bush's actions apparently subsided. On "the eve" of the initial bombing
campaign in Iraq,7 ° Congress statutorily authorized the use of military force against
Iraq. 71 This authorization was the first of its kind since World War 11.72
2. Kosovo
After the Persian Gulf War, the United States was involved in several small military
conflicts around the world,7 3 including the former Yugoslavia. Various new countries
had formed following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, there was a
great degree of conflict between the many ethnicities within these new states. In March
1999, despite no authorization from Congress, President Clinton ordered air and
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the province of
Kosovo. 74 Even though there had not been any congressional authorization for the
strikes, and they were not defensive, President Clinton claimed that the attacks were
well within his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Armed Forces. 75
Members of Congress were incensed over President Clinton's unilateral use of
force.76 Particularly angered was Representative Tom Campbell, who felt that
President Clinton had violated the War Powers Resolution by maintaining a military
operation for longer than sixty days without congressional assent.77 Congressman
Campbell, along with thirty other members of Congress, filed a lawsuit against
President Clinton, seeking a declaration that President Clinton had violated the War
Powers Resolution and that the military operation in Kosovo was unconstitutional.78
The court dismissed the case, however, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because "[a]n asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with the law is
not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court."79 Further, the
68. Id. at 820.
69. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (suit by fifty-four members of
Congress dismissed because it was not ripe); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990)
(Sergeant's suit dismissed for lack of ripeness).
70. See Kahn, supra note 49, at 25.
71. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-01,
105 Stat. 3 (1991).
72. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 48, at 836.
73. Seeid. at 839-44.
74. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 527-28
(Mar. 26, 1999).
75. Id.
76. See Corn, supra note 42, at 1176-78.
77. Press Release, Statement by Congressman Campbell on Kosovo, at
http://www.house.gov/campbell/990324.htm (Mar. 24, 1999) (last visited Jan. 2002) (site no
longer available); see also War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000).
78. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999).
79. Id. at 41 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)).
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court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were unable to show
that their inability to vote on the military operation in Kosovo represented a
"constitutional impasse" or "actual confrontation" 80 between the President and
Congress, or that their votes "would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific
legislative act." 81 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit")
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case.
82
E. Conclusion
In 1998, the House of Representatives passed a bill that attempted to limit the
President's ability to conduct war, providing that no funds "may be used to initiate or
conduct offensive military operations by [U.S. Armed Forces] except in accordance
with the war powers clause of the Constitution, which vests in Congress the power to
declare and authorize war.",83 The bill, however, did not pass in the Senate. Had both
houses of Congress passed this bill, it certainly would have been a step toward
Congress regaining its constitutional war powers. 84 Even though zealous Presidents
have eroded congressional war powers in the last sixty years, there is still hope for
Congress, especially when it does not authorize military action.
II. CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE OR DISAPPROVAL OF A MILITARY OPERATION
Per section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the President has sixty days of free
rein to engage in military hostilities without congressional authorization.8 5 Once that
sixty-day period has tolled (and Congress has not authorized the action), Congress has
full constitutional power to pass a law requiring the removal of U.S. troops from that
military hostility. Not only is this contemplated by the War Powers Resolution,86 but
the Framers of the Constitution would also support such a removal, as would Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson using their tests from Youngstown. Assuming the sixty-day
period has passed, the President would be powerless to challenge Congress's law in
this situation.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Id. at 42 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997)).
82. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
83. H.R. 4103, 105th Cong. § 8106 (1998).
84. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1008; Hahn, supra note 23, at 2391.
85. See War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000) (If the President does not
get congressional approval of a military action within sixty days, he must terminate the action,
or he can extend the deadline an additional thirty days if he feels that it is an "unavoidable
military necessity."); see also Dennis J. Kucinich, The Power to Make War, 34 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 61, 65-66 (2000).
86. War Powers Resolution § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2000):
Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are
engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and
territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.




It is clear that the Framers would have been categorically opposed to the President
taking unilateral military action without congressional authorization, except when the
United States or its troops abroad were suddenly attacked and the President needed to
repel such attacks.8 7 This power did not carry over into initiating offensive attacks. 88
Rather, a self-defensive action "would preserve the status quo and thus enable
congressional deliberation to go forward with respect to the larger issues of whether or
not to go to war."
89
Aware of the horrors of the British monarchy and the complete unilateral control of
the King over the British military,90 the Framers desired a more balanced system of war
powers, where one person (the President) could not determine "whether a war ought to
be commenced, continued or concluded." 9' Therefore, the President was only able to
command the military "as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service
of the Union."
92
Moreover, the text of the Constitution explicitly bestows on Congress the right to
declare war9 3 and to raise and maintain Armies94 and a Navy. 95 It is only after Congress
declares war, or statutorily authorizes a military operation, that the President may
assume command of the Armed Forces. 96 This is a clear indication that the Framers
would not have allowed a President to take unilateral military action without
congressional assent. Given the amount of constitutional control over initiation and
support of military operations that the Framers vested in Congress, compared to the
relatively limited control the Constitution gives to the President, one can confidently
conclude that the Framers would support a law by Congress requiring removal of U.S.
troops from a military operation in the absence of prior congressional authorization for
that operation.
B. Application of Justice Frankfurter's Test from Youngstown
Justice Frankfurter's opinion used past presidential and congressional practice as a
guide for interpreting separation of powers issues. 9 7 He used a three-part test to
87. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Sheffer, supra note 40, at 258-59
(discussing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), and President Lincoln's authority to
take defensive actions against the Confederacy after the attack on Fort Sumter).
88. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
89. See Kahn, supra note 49, at 20.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The
king of Great Britain ... [has] at all times the entire command of all the militia within [his]
several jurisdictions ... [and the king's power] extends to the declaring of war and the raising
and regulating of fleets and armies.") (emphasis in original).
91.6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
92. Supra note 90.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 11.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 12.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 13.
96. See U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief...
when [the Armed Forces are] called into the actual Service of the United States.").
97. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593-614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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determine that President Truman's actions were unconstitutional. The first requirement
in the test is whether the President's practice had been "systematic, unbroken... [and]
long pursued. 98 This, in essence, would work to establish some legitimacy to the
President's actions, as opposed to when the President had just recently started a
particular practice. The second element is whether Congress has had notice of this
established practice. 99 "This is essential because a conclusion that an executive
exercise of power is based on the Constitution has the potential consequence of
disabling the Congress from participating in such exercise,"0° so there needs to be a
showing of Congress's acquiescence in the President's practice. °0 The third
requirement is that the President's practice must have been "never before questioned"
by Congress. 10 2 If Congress had previously challenged the President's practice, it
would tend to prove that Congress felt the President's actions were unconstitutional.
0 3
The first element in Justice Frankfurter's test, "systematic, unbroken... [and] long
pursued" past practice by the President, 104 would lean slightly in favor of Congress.
While Presidents have not always strictly complied with the requirements of
constitutional war powers or the War Powers Resolution, 0 5 there has been some sort
of congressional authorization for most U.S. military actions.' 0 6 One would be hard-
pressed to say that Presidents have always complied with their constitutional and
statutory obligations in times of war. However, the President's control over U.S.
military actions without a declaration of war or congressional authorization cannot be
considered a longstanding practice because it has arguably never occurred. 
07
Justice Frankfurter's second and third requirements, therefore, would also fall in
favor of Congress. Without a longstanding presidential practice of military control
absent any sort of congressional assent, obviously Congress cannot have had notice of
or have challenged such a practice. If the President were to argue that past Presidents
have unilaterally controlled military operations,108 and thus Congress has been on
notice, the President would still fail. Simply because there has been a history of
constitutionally questionable practice does not make that practice de facto
constitutional.' 09
98. Id. at 610.
99. Id.
100. Corn, supra note 42, at 1159.
101. Id.
102. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
103. Corn, supra note 42, at 1159.
104. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
105. See supra Parts I.B-D.
106. See supra Parts I.B-D.
107. A possible exception would be President Clinton's military operation in Kosovo. See
supra Part II.D.2. Another possible exception would be President Reagan's unilateral control
over the 1983 military operation in Grenada. However, the conflict lasted only one week, so
there was insufficient time for much of a controversy to unfold. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note
48, at 814.
108. See supra Parts I.B-D.
109. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Deeply embedded
traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation
. .. "); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down the longstanding
congressional use of the legislative veto); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)
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In conclusion, as opposed to when war is declared or statutorily authorized, a
President acting unilaterally without congressional authorization would plainly fail
Justice Frankfurter's test. Therefore, a law requiring removal of U.S. forces would be
considered constitutional by Justice Frankfurter. Any presidential challenges to such a
law would not hold any ground. Thus, in the hypothetical situation presented in this
Note, Congress would clearly pass Justice Frankfurter's test from Youngstown.
C. Application of Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson set forth three different scenarios where a
possible conflict could arise between Congress and the President. '10 The first instance
is when the President acts according to explicit or implied congressional
authorization."' Here, the President's "authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."" 2 The second
instance is a "zone of twilight," where Congress has not spoken (one way or the other)
about the particular practice, and therefore there is an element of uncertainty regarding
the roles of both the President and Congress." 3 In these situations, "congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes ... enable, if not invite, measures
on independent presidential responsibility," and the test of power should rely on
contemporary circumstances, "rather than on abstract theories of law.," 14 The third
instance occurs when the President acts in direct conflict with Congress's express or
implied 15 Here, the President's power "is at its lowest ebb" because he must rely
solely on his constitutional powers, subtracted from any of Congress's constitutional
powers.11 6 Justice Jackson noted that a finding for the President in the third instance
would virtually disable Congress's power over that particular subject, and could
possibly disrupt the constitutional equilibrium between the two branches.'17
Under Justice Jackson's Youngstown test, Congress clearly has the authority to pass
a law requiring the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from a military hostility
after the sixty-day (or ninety-day after extension) War Powers Resolution period has
passed. 18 By refusing to acknowledge such a congressional mandate, the President
would be acting against the express will of Congress, which means that the President's
power would be "at its lowest ebb." 19
Here, "the President must have exclusive constitutional authority in order for his
("[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use
..... ); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) ("That an unconstitutional action
has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less constitutional at a later
date.").
110. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 635.
112. Id.




117. Id. at 637-38.
118. See War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000).
119. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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action to be legitimate."1 20 The Constitution makes it clear that the President may only
take command of the Armed Forces when they are "called into the actual Service of the
United States."' 2'1 Congress is the only governmental body authorized by the
Constitution to call the Armed Forces into service.'22 To hold in favor of the President
in a situation like this would be to "[disable] the Congress from acting upon the
subject," 123 virtually nullifying congressional constitutional war powers and giving the
President free reign over all aspects of war making. Therefore, a Presidential challenge
to a law requiring him to remove troops from a military operation in the absence of
congressional authorization for that action would fail Justice Jackson's test.
D. Conclusion
The President's constitutional power over the Armed Forces begins when Congress
declares war or statutorily authorizes military force.' 24 While the War Powers
Resolution (and not the Constitution) seemingly allows the President to act unilaterally
for sixty days in a military operation,' 25 if Congress were to pass a law requiring the
President to remove troops from that military operation (or a law cutting off funds for
that operation), the law would unquestionably be considered constitutional. The
constitutional balance would be in favor of Congress, and not the President.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AVENUES OF ENFORCEMENT FOR A LAW REQUIRING THE
PRESIDENT TO REMOVE TROOPS FROM A MILITARY OPERATION
Congress would have several avenues available to enforce its constitutional
authority over the President should the President disregard a law requiring removal of
U.S. Armed Forces from a military operation (or cutting off funds for the military
operation). The most drastic of these avenues would be for Congress to impeach the
President. 126 A less drastic measure would be for members of Congress to sue to enjoin
the President from continuing the military operation. A suit of this kind would have the
most likelihood of success if more than half of the members of Congress (preferably
two-thirds) joined in the suit. Third, and perhaps the least drastic, Congress could use
120. Corn, supra note 42, at 1160 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
121. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress has the power to declare war.).
123. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
124. The exception is cases of sudden attack against the United States or its troops abroad,
where the President can use force to repel such attacks. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
125. See War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000).
126. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives... shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments ... And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President... shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.").
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the power of the purse to cut off spending for such an operation.12 7 It is assumed that
the President would veto such a bill, whether the bill proposed to remove troops or cut
funding for the operation, but that Congress would pass the law over his veto.
128
A. Impeachment
In a government of checks and balances and separation of powers, impeachment is
Congress's check on the President. If the President were unable to convince Congress
to provide authorization for a military operation, a continuation of that operation would
be an abuse of the President's constitutional power.129 Such an abuse is impeachable. 3 °
However, impeachment proceedings are so rare13' that it would be highly unlikely that
Congress would take this route.
Even if two-thirds of Congress had voted to override the President's veto regarding
removal of troops, there is no guarantee that the House of Representatives would
initiate impeachment proceedings, or that two-thirds of the Senate would vote to
impeach the President. This is especially true considering the infrequency of
presidential impeachment and the fact that no President has ever been removed from
office via impeachment.' 32 Partisan politics might further hamper the possibility of
impeachment, since Senators (and Representatives) generally vote along party lines.
Further, if the past is a prologue to the future, an alleged abuse of war powers was
explicitly rejected by the House Judiciary Committee as an article of impeachment of
127. See Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Congress has
formidable weapons at its disposal[, such as] the power of the purse .... ); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I (Congress has the power to pass "All Bills for raising Revenue."); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (Congress shall "raise and support Armies.") (emphasis added); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (Congress shall "provide and maintain a Navy.") (emphasis added);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law .... ). This Note does not deal with this issue directly, but
rather assumes that cutting (or not appropriating) funding for military operations is always an
option. This Note also assumes that in dealing with the specific hypothetical here (an event that
has never occurred), Congress would rather choose to sue to enjoin the President from
continuing a military operation, in an effort to restore the balance in war powers that has been
lost over the last six decades.
128. Presumably, if Congress were to pass a bill over the President's veto requiring the
President to remove troops from a military operation, Congress would also pass a bill over the
President's veto that would cut off funding for that military operation.
129. See supra Part II.
130. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1005.
131. Only three Presidents have ever gone through impeachment proceedings. Andrew
Johnson in 1868 came one vote shy of being convicted by the Senate after firing the Secretary of
War without the Senate's consent. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 251-52 (4th ed. 2000). In 1974, impeachment proceedings were underway for
Richard Nixon's involvement in the Watergate scandal; however, Nixon resigned before he
could be removed from office. See id. at 640-42. The House of Representatives impeached Bill
Clinton in December 1998 for allegedly committing perjury, but the Senate acquitted him in
February 1999. See id. at 735.
132. See supra note 131.
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Richard Nixon in 1974. 133 None of this is to suggest that it would be impossible for
Congress to impeach a President for failing to remove troops after Congress passed a
law directing him to do so. It tends to show that a successful impeachment would be
unlikely, however.
B. A Lawsuit by Members of Congress to Enjoin the President's Continued Military
Activities
As an alternative to impeachment, after passing the law requiring the removal of
troops from a military operation over the President's veto, members of Congress could
sue the President, seeking an injunction requiring the President to enforce Congress's
law and remove troops. In the past, congressional suits challenging the President's
constitutional war powers and the President's powers under the War Powers
Resolution in the wake of military conflicts have been unsuccessful. There were two
suits against President Ronald Reagan, one against President George H.W. Bush, and
one against President Bill Clinton.' 
34
In Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan,'35 the District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed a suit by twelve members of the House of Representatives, who challenged
President Reagan's actions in Nicaragua under the War Powers Resolution. The court
said that the issue was nonjusticiable, since Congress was at the time considering the
validity of President Reagan's actions.136 As such, if the court were to step in, it would
interrupt the institutional roles of the respective branches of the government.' 37
A year later, in 1984, eleven members of the House challenged President Reagan's
authority to unilaterally control the week-long military operation in Grenada in late
133. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, H. REP. No. 93-1305, 11 (1974).
134. Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp.
2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), afftd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (suit by twenty-six (with five more
joining the suit later) members of the House of Representatives seeking declaration that
President Clinton violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the War Powers
Resolution by conducting air strikes in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization
dismissed because the Representatives lacked standing); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141
(D.D.C. 1990) (suit by fifty-four members of Congress seeking to enjoin President Bush from
going to war against Iraq without first obtaining congressional authorization dismissed as not
ripe for adjudication); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), afftd, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As a side note, there has been one case against President George W.
Bush, which was dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing. Callan v. Bush, No.
4:03CV3060 (D. Neb. Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cllnbsh43003mem.pdf. However, this suit was filed by an former member of Congress,
Clair A. Callan, who served as a Representative from Nebraska from 1965 to 1967.
GoMemphis: America At War, http://staging.gomemphis.com/mca/america-at-war/article/
0,1426,MCA 945_1928261,00.html. However, since former Rep. Callan is no longer a member
of Congress, the suit has little bearing on the hypothetical situation or the analysis presented in
this Note.
135. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), afftd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 600.
137. Id.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
1983.' The D.C. Circuit upheld a district court holding, which dismissed the case as
moot, since U.S. troops had long since been removed from Grenada, and thus, there
was no presidential activity that could be enjoined.139 The suits against Presidents Bush
(Dellums v. Bush140) and Clinton (Campbell v. Clinton141) will be discussed below in
Part III.B.2.
What these suits have lacked, among other things, is the backing of a majority of
Congress. There has never been a suit against the President involving a majority of the
members of Congress. If Congress were to pass a law over the President's veto, an
ensuing suit by members of Congress would also rely on the War Powers Resolution
and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution. A court would likely find in favor of
the members of Congress, and not dismiss the suit for lack of standing, if two-thirds of
Congress joined in the suit (or authorized certain members to sue on their behalf). As
shown below, the best avenue of relief would be for the members of Congress to sue
under a separation of powers conflict theory, rather than strictly under the War Powers
Resolution.
1. The Invalidity of Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution
Presumably, members of Congress would sue the President for not complying with
the War Powers Resolution. 42 It is in this respect that it is both important and
necessary that Congress passes a law over the President's veto, rather than just passing
a concurrent resolution without presentment to the President calling for the end of a
military operation, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution. 43 Applying
INS v. Chadha'4 to the War Powers Resolution, section 5(c) is unconstitutional
because it does not follow the proper constitutional process of lawmaking.
In Chadha, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional section 244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized one House of Congress to pass a
resolution to invalidate an executive branch decision to keep a deportable alien in the
United States. The Court relied on the Presentment Clause of the Constitution,
45
138. Conyers, 765 F.2d 1124.
139. Id. at 1127.
140. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
141. 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
142. This is assuming that the President has not complied with the War Powers Resolution
by consulting with Congress before and during the military conflict. See generally War Powers
Resolution §§ 2-9, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). If the President had complied with the
consultation requirements of the War Powers Resolution, and Congress had still not authorized
the military operation after sixty days, see War Powers Resolution §§ 3-5, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542-
44 (2000), Congress would undoubtedly have a successful claim that the President did not
comply with section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, which requires the President to remove
troops after sixty days if Congress has not approved of the military operation.
143. "[A]t any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or
specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so
directs by concurrent resolution." War Powers Resolution § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2000).
144. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
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finding that, in allowing the President to have the veto power, the Framers were careful
"to check whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident, or ill-considered measures.' 46 As such, the Court struck down section
244(c)(2) because it was not "in conformity with the express procedures of the
Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses
and presentment to the President."
47
Similar to the unconstitutional section 244(c)(2) in Chadha, section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution authorizes Congress, by concurrent resolution, to require the
President to remove troops from a military conflict. 48 Section 5(c) is a congressional
attempt to invalidate an executive branch decision to keep troops involved. To be
constitutional, and within the holding in Chadha, the concurrent resolution under
section 5(c) would have to follow all of the requirements of the Presentment Clause,
allowing the President a chance to veto the resolution if so desired. Section 5(c) is
unconstitutional because it merely allows one House of Congress to unilaterally act
(with the approval of the other House) to require the President to remove troops, with
or without his consent. Thus, for a successful congressional claim of unconstitutional
behavior on the part of the President in this context, it is necessary for both Houses to
pass a law, allow the law to go to the President, and then repass the law over the
President's veto. Congress cannot expect to rely on section 5(c) of the War Powers
Resolution.
2. The Shortcomings of the Challenges in Dellums and Campbell
The two most recent congressional attempts at challenging the President's
constitutional war powers authority were both dismissed. Dellums v. Bush 149 was
dismissed for lack of ripeness and Campbell v. Clinton'50 was dismissed because the
congressional challengers lacked standing.
a. Dellums v. Bush
In Dellums, fifty-four members of Congress sought to enjoin President Bush from
pursuing any offensive attacks against Iraq without first receiving a declaration of war
or statutory authorization from Congress. President Bush argued that the case had to be
dismissed because determining whether a military operation is an offensive one is a
political question, and therefore nonjusticiable. He claimed that the Constitution is
designed "to have the various war- and military-related provisions [relating to
Congress and the President] construed and acting together, ... [which means that it is
House of Representatives may be necessary... shall be presented to the President
of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by
him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate
and House of Representatives ....
146. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-48.
147. Id. at 957-58.
148. War Powers Resolution § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2000).
149. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
150. 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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not] a legal question."' 151 The court, however, thought differently. Relying on Mitchell
v. Laird, 152 the court posited that "courts do not lack the power and the ability to make
the factual and legal determination of whether this nation's military actions constitute
war for purposes of the constitutional War Clause."' 153 Further, the court pointed out
that "courts have historically made determinations about whether this country was at
war for many other purposes-the construction of treaties, statutes, and even insurance
contracts[,] ... even in the absence of a congressional declaration."' 54
Next, the court dealt with the issue of standing, and held that the members of
Congress did indeed have standing to sue. Using the standing test from Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. 155 and
Allen v. Wright, 56 the plaintiff has to allege: "(1) that he personally suffered actual or
threatened injury, and (2) that the 'injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action"
and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable action."'' 157 The court found that the
members of Congress had alleged a constitutional injury because "members of
Congress plainly have an interest in protecting their right to vote on matters entrusted
to their respective chambers by the Constitution."
'158
The court also found that there was a "real and immediate" threatened injury,
because once the President goes to war, Congress would lose its constitutional right to
declare war.' 59 Finally, the court held that the members of Congress had no more
legislative remedies available, because even a joint resolution advising the President
not to go to war with Iraq "would not be likely to stop [him] ... if he is persuaded that
the Constitution affirmatively gives him the power to act otherwise."' 160 The court
further noted that the legislative remedies of impeachment and cutting military funding
"would not afford the relief sought by the plaintiffs-which is the guarantee that they
will have the opportunity to debate and vote on the wisdom of initiating a military
attack against Iraq before the United States Military becomes embroiled in
belligerency with that nation."'
6
'
After determining that the members of Congress had standing, the court then moved
to the issue of ripeness, holding that the claim was not ripe. First, the court noted that
Congress had not clearly stated either way whether or not it supported the military
effort against Iraq.162 "[A] dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for
judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority."' 163 The court then went on to say that only a majority of Congress would be
151. Id. at 1144-45.
152. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1146.
154. Id. (citing N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946); Prize Cases,
67 U.S. 635 (1863)).
155. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
156. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
157. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1147.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1149.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1149-50.
163. Id. at 1150 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J.,
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able to obtain relief from a court, because only a majority of Congress has the
competency to declare war. 164 Further, the court held that the President had not clearly
shown a military commitment "to a definitive course of action" that could necessarily
be categorized as "war," which meant that President Bush's actions could also not
support a claim of ripeness, therefore, the case was dismissed. 
165
b. Campbell v. Clinton
In Campbell,166 twenty-six members of the House of Representatives (five more
Representatives joined the suit later) sued President Clinton, seeking a declaration that
the President had violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the War
Powers Resolution by not obtaining a declaration of war or statutory authorization
from Congress for initiating and continuing air strikes in Kosovo. 167 The suit came
after several unsuccessful attempts by Congress to both support and terminate the
Kosovo military operation.' 68 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs sought an order demanding
the removal of troops within thirty days.' 6 9 In his defense, President Clinton filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the issue presented
was a nonjusticiable political question, and that the issues were not ripe for resolution
by a court.
70
The court quickly dismissed the President's political question claim, '7 and moved
on to a determination of whether or not the members of Congress had standing to sue.
To have standing, the plaintiffs would have had to show that they "suffered an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, and that the dispute
is traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." 172 In
this case, they lacked standing because their claim against the President was "too
generalized an injury to provide a legislator with standing.' 7 3
Regardless, the members of Congress argued under Coleman v. Miller'74 that the
concurring)).
164. Id. at 1151.
165. Id. at 1152.
166. 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
167. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
168. Id. at 37-39 (The Senate passed a concurrent resolution authorizing air strikes, but the
House rejected it by a 213-213 vote; the House rejected a joint resolution declaring war against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the House rejected a concurrent resolution that would have
required President Clinton to remove troops, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers
Resolution; the House passed a bill prohibiting Department of Defense funds to be used for
deploying grounds troops with specific congressional authorization; and Congress passed the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which gave supplemental appropriations for the
conflict, but contained no section that was meant to satisfy the congressional authorization
requirement of the War Powers Resolution.).
169. Id. at 39.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 40 n.5 (explaining that not all War Powers Clause claims involve a nonjusticiable
political question).
172. Id. at 41 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)).
173. Id. at 42.
174. 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (The Supreme Court upheld standing for half of the Kansas state
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President injured the members of Congress by nullifying or ignoring Congress. 75
However, the court held that Coleman had since been limited, and that "legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative act
have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into
effect), on the grounds that their votes have been completely nullified."' 76 Therefore,
since Congress had not given any "clear, consistent message" to the President on
whether or not air strikes in Kosovo were authorized, the members of Congress lacked
standing.177 Further, the relatively few number of plaintiffs (31 out of 535 members of
Congress) did not represent the majority of Congress, nor had the plaintiffs been
authorized to represent the 213 members who voted against the air strikes,' 78 which
further invalidated the members' claim that they had standing.
179
The court went further with regard to the issue that Congress had sent mixed signals
to the President, and noted that the President had merely continued the air strikes
despite Congress's division.180 Without an explicit congressional decision one way or
another, the President cannot reasonably act against the wishes of Congress. Therefore,
the lack of a confrontation between Congress and the President prevented the members
of Congress from having standing. "Absent a clear impasse between the executive and
legislative branches, resort to the judicial branch is inappropriate." ' 8'
Because the district court did not deal with the President's alleged failure to
conform with the War Powers Resolution, the members of Congress appealed.182 The
D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the members lacked standing.' 
8 3
Because Congress never unilaterally disapproved of President Clinton's actions, the
plaintiffs could not claim that their votes had been nullified by the President.
8 4
3. Likelihood of Success of a Congressional Challenge with No Congressional
Approval of the President's Military Actions
With the ninety-day period 8 5 tolled and a law passed over the President's veto
requiring him to remove troops from a military operation in the absence of
congressional authorization, members of Congress would be able to turn to the courts
if the President refused to abide by Congress's order. As shown above, the merits of
the congressional claim would have passed constitutional muster.186 However, under
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Dellums and Campbell, the real questions are whether or not the claim would be ripe
and whether or not the members of Congress would have standing. While Dellums and
Campbell seem to stand for the proposition that it is difficult for members of Congress
to successfully sue the President for violations of constitutional war powers, a situation
like the one hypothesized here has never occurred. The dicta in both cases clearly
supports the conclusion that a court would in fact choose to rule on the merits of this
case, rather than dismiss the case, as was done in Dellums and Campbell.
a. Applying Dellums
If the President were to argue that it is his determination as to whether or not a
military action is a war in the constitutional sense, and thus the issue is a nonjusticiable
political question, the members of Congress would rely on Dellums to defeat the
President's claim. The court in Dellums explicitly stated that courts in the past have
made determinations about whether the United States was at war. 87 Further, "courts do
not lack the power and the ability to make the factual and legal determination of
whether this nation's military actions constitute war for purposes of the constitutional
War Clause."' 88 Therefore, the congressional claim would be justiciable, and not fall
into the realm of a political question.
Next, the Dellums court looked at the issue of standing, and found that the members
of Congress satisfied the requirements of Allen v. Wright.189 They had shown a
threatened injury-that if the President were to go to war without congressional
authorization, Congress would lose its constitutional right to declare war.' 90 Further,
the court found that there were no more legislative remedies available because a joint
resolution would be merely advisory, and the remedies of impeachment and cutting
military funding would not allow Congress the relief it sought, which was the ability to
debate and vote on whether or not to go to war in the first place.' 9' As such, in the
hypothetical situation here, the President could not successfully argue that Congress
could use other avenues to achieve its end instead of seeking an injunction. Rather,
Dellums stands for the proposition that Congress has a constitutional right to declare
(or not declare) war, and standing to assert that right.
Where Dellums and the hypothetical situation presented in this Note would differ is
with respect to ripeness. The Dellums court held that the members of Congress had not
presented a ripe claim because both the President and Congress had not decisively
asserted their respective constitutional authority. 19 2 Also, the court held that only a
majority of Congress could obtain relief from a court, because only a majority of
Congress can affirmatively declare war.' 93 Further, since President Bush's military
action at the time of the suit could not be definitively categorized as "war," the case
was dismissed for lack of ripeness.' 
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In the hypothetical situation presented here, Congress has asserted its constitutional
authority by passing a law over the President's veto. The President could argue that he
has not yet conducted war in the constitutional sense, and that the military commitment
could not be categorized as "war."' 195 However, in vetoing the bill, the President would
seem to say that he would like the military operation to proceed further, rather than
agree with Congress's wishes to cease the operation. As such, a court could not
conclude that the issue is not ripe, because Congress and the President would have
both "assert[ed] [their] constitutional authority"'196 through the legislative and
presentment processes. Further, if a majority of Congress (and even more favorably
two-thirds) were to join in the suit (or authorize certain members of Congress to sue on
their behalf), according to Dellums, the claim would be ripe. 97
b. Applying Campbell
Campbell seemed to further narrow the possibility of a congressional suit
challenging the President's constitutional war powers. However, upon further
examination, Campbell would help the congressional claim in the hypothetical
situation presented here. While the court in Campbell dismissed the congressional
claims due to lack of standing because the claim was too general, 198 the holding relied
on the fact that Congress had sent mixed signals to the President about whether or not
it supported President Clinton's air strikes in Kosovo. 199 This, combined with the fact
that only thirty-one members of Congress were represented in the suit, led to the
conclusion that the members of Congress in Campbell did not show that their votes had
been completely nullified by President Clinton's continued air strikes.2°° The important
rule to extract from Campbell is that the President could not have been said to have
acted against Congress's explicit actions since Congress had not clearly acted one way
or another. Thus, there was no constitutional impasse that would require the judiciary
to step in.2° '
On the other hand, in the hypothetical situation presented here, Congress, in passing
a law over the President's veto, would have clearly and explicitly sent a message to the
President that it disapproved of the President's unilateral control over a military action.
By ignoring Congress's law and continuing the military operation, the President would
essentially nullify each Congress member's vote for the bill, trampling their
constitutionally sanctioned rights in the process. Further, there would be a
constitutional impasse because the President and Congress would have both asserted
their constitutional authority over the military action, with neither party willing to yield
195. Obviously, the magnitude of a military operation would shed some light on whether or
not it could be considered a "war." Factors to look for would include, but should not be limited
to: the number of troops deployed; the predicted length of the operation; the type of weaponry
used; whether or not ground forces had been deployed; and the frequency and magnitude of any
air strikes.
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1066 (Vol. 78:1045
2003] WAR POWERS: CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL AND SUIT 1067
to the other. Thus, if two-thirds of the members of Congress were to join together in a
suit against the President (either directly or by allowing certain members to sue on
their behalf), under Campbell the suit would be justiciable, and the members of
Congress would have standing to sue.
C. Conclusion
With impeachment an unlikely option in this hypothetical situation, Congress must
turn to the judiciary in order to regain the war-making powers that Presidents have
taken from it over the past six decades. The erosion of congressional war powers has
gone on long enough, and not even the War Powers Resolution has been able to stop it.
There is a framework in place for Congress to launch a successful suit against the
President, if necessary. Dellums and Campbell both have their shortcomings; however,
those shortcomings will not prevent future Congresses from asserting their
constitutional war powers in court, and enjoining the President from disregarding
Congress's law. Dellums shows that this claim would be ripe for judicial review, and
Campbell provides a basis for congressional standing and the justiciability of the
claim. All of this analysis points to Congress regaining its constitutional war-making
powers with the help of a federal court and enjoining the President from further
military action.
CONCLUSION
This Note has presented a hypothetical situation in which Congress, over the
President's veto, passes a law requiring the removal of troops from a military
operation, when there has been no previous congressional authorization for the
operation. Since the 1940s, there has been a steady decline in the consultation between
the President and Congress with regard to going to war. The passage of the War
Powers Resolution in 1973 looked like a step in the right direction for Congress. In
particular, Presidents since its passage have found ways to "comply" with the
Resolution while continuing to maintain the imbalance of war-making powers between
Congress and the President. One would hope that the Executive and Legislative
Branches of the government would not be in such disaccord that Congress would resort
to a lawsuit against the President to enforce a law requiring the removal of troops from
a military operation. However, as Dellums and Campbell have shown, all members of
Congress have not looked upon the President's unilateral control over recent military
actions favorably.
Congress has authorized the use of military force in the current conflict with Iraq.
However, perhaps the next time a President unilaterally commences an unpopular
military action, Congress will become more vigilant in its protest of the President's
actions. If President George W. Bush had invoked the military operation in Iraq
without Congress's consent, Congress could have passed a law over President Bush's
veto requiring the removal of American troops from that operation. Relying on the
analysis discussed above, Congress would be able to successfully stake its war powers
claim in a federal court, and enjoin President George W. Bush from any further
military action in Iraq without first seeking congressional authorization. Justices
Frankfurter's and Jackson's respective constitutional impasse tests from Youngstown
would supply Congress with the constitutional merit for such a claim. Dellums and
Campbell, respectively, provide the basis to show that this claim would be ripe for
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judicial review and that Congress does indeed have standing to assert its claim. Unlike
his father in Dellums, President George W. Bush would not have been so successful in
court defending his unilateral military actions.
